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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to critically analyse the evolution of the Romanian directors’ duties under the reign of the 
neutrality rule instated by the European Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids. The issue of the takeover relevant 
directors’ duties has not been specifically and critically addressed in Romania. We reach the conclusion that due to 
similarities between the American and Romanian directors’ fiduciary duties and considering that the Romanian capital 
market is an area that is heading towards further development, the natural progression of the duties of directors of the 
companies present on the Bucharest Stock Exchange should follow the organic evolution of their American counterparts.  
This development is, however, artificially altered by the European neutrality rule. As shown above, the protection of 
Romanian minority shareholders is deficient under the European rule and the interests of Romanian companies and their 
shareholders may be affected by the application of the neutrality rule. Furthermore, the European Directive 2004/25/EC 
creates a disadvantage for European companies compared to their non-European equivalents, primarily in regard to U.S. 
companies. 
For these reasons we conclude that it is necessary de lege ferenda to diminish the application of the neutrality rule at 
least in Romania’s case. This initiative should be accompanied by a reconsideration of Romanian directors’ duties in hostile 
takeover through the lens of their American counterparts’ position, the next stage in the evolution of the legal and economic 
field, as mentioned above. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the main components of a country's economic growth is the development of capital markets. 
They provide strategy development, diversification, channelling surplus funds while facilitating an alternative 
to institutional finance and/or banking. Share purchase and thus takeovers are key components of capital 
markets and their regulation and control is a strategic policy decision with a direct impact on the economic 
growth of a country (Siems, 2007). This reasoning has greater relevance for Romania where the stock market 
continues its natural development, as a representative example of an emerging market. From this vantage point, 
the effectiveness of the legal frameworks complements the before-mentioned objective and helps corporations 
to seek growth opportunities through reorganization.  
 This study verifies its importance precisely because it considers the ripple effect created by European 
law on the legal and economic developments of Romanian capital market, finally venturing to suggest 
prospects of reform to ensure a harmonious and sustainable development of the Romanian market. The analysis 
also shows its originality through the fact that it addresses the issue of hostile takeovers at the Romanian and 
European level from the perspective of directors (a type of analysis that was not often been attempted), 
directors who are both the first line of defence of the company and the shareholders in case of merger and the 
thrusters for the economic development of the company and indirectly the economic growth of Romania. 
 One of the most important European law on takeover bids, hostile takeovers and directors duties in 
this department is the Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and Council, Directive on Takeover 
Bids (from now on referred to as Directive). This rule is especially important as the previous legal attempts 
were blocked or rejected following political controversy and legal debates about the creation of a European 
system of standardized rules on takeover bids. For a long time scientists have considered (Gilson, 1992) that 
such an approach is not really plausible because of the diversity of approaches on takeover bids across Member 
States. 
 Precisely because of these legal disputes and controversy the current version of the Directive is 
extremely flexible and permissive, allowing Member States to derogate from much of its key provisions. This 
analysis aims to highlight the main features of the directors’ duties covered by this Directive, trying to 
determine the impact of these legislative changes on the fiduciary duties of Romanian directors already present 
at the national level (the Romanian fiduciary duties will be analysed from the perspective of the corresponding 
norms in the US law). It should be noted that this analysis does not try to determine the superiority of a system 
but to highlight which of these systems offer increased protection to the company without harming Romanian 
shareholders’ position in the takeover process. Indeed the protection of shareholder is main objective of the 
European norm, as stated in the preamble of the Directive. 
 Before we begin, it should be emphasized that between the European and American approach to 
directors’ duties in takeover bids there are differences of content and even stronger ones of principle. In 
general, American directors’ fiduciary duties in the context of a shift in control of the company are to act in 
good faith, with due diligence and loyalty towards what they consider to be the best interests of the company 
and its components. Although the directors’ actions or lack thereof are verified by the American courts, there is 
a noticeable leniency in the judicial censorship of directors in the event of hostile takeovers. Unlike the 
American system, as we shall see below, the European system opts for a strict limitation of the initiative of 
directors in such situations (embodied in the European neutrality rule). It is interesting to note that, through the 
European attempt to harmonize national rules in this sphere, the differences between these two systems (Tison, 
2009) have been exacerbated to a larger degree. 
 
2. The Directive 2004/25/EC and its impact on the duties of directors of Romanian companies listed on 
the Bucharest Stock Exchange 
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2.1. Directors’ duties in light of the hostile takeovers provisions of the Directive - the general framework 
 
 In regard to the issue of directors’ duties, the Directive states in art. 9 para. 2 that the board of the 
offeree company shall obtain the prior authorization of the general meeting of shareholders given for this 
purpose before taking any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result in the frustration of the 
bid and in particular before issuing any shares which may result in a lasting impediment to the offeror’s 
acquiring control of the offeree company (poison pill defensive measure). 
 Regarding the time of this obligation arises, art. 9 para. 2 indicates that such authorization is required 
at least since the administrative or management body of the company receives information on demand and 
supply as far as the result was made public or the bid lapses. Member States may require that this authorization 
be obtained at an earlier stage, for example when the administrative or management body of the company 
concerned is aware of the impending offer. 
 Regarding the decisions that were taken before the beginning of this period and not yet partly or fully 
implemented, art. 9 para. 3 provides that the general meeting of shareholders (GSM) approves or confirms any 
decision which does not fall in the normal course of business of the firm and whose implementation may 
frustrate a bid. 
 It should be noted that the Directive provides both an opt-out Member States and an opt-in for 
companies. As such art. 12 para. 1 states that Member States may reserve the right not to require companies 
whose head office is situated in their territory to apply Article 9 (2) and (3) (i.e. the neutrality rule). In 
accordance with art. 12 para. 2 however, where Member States make use of this option, they must provide 
companies whose head office is situated in their territory the opportunity to apply the rule of neutrality. So 
member States have the option of an opt-out from the rule of neutrality but they must leave open the possibility 
of an individual company opt-in. 
 
2.2. Impact of the Directive on the obligations of directors of listed companies in Romania 
 
 The rule from art. 9 para. 2 of the Directive, called the doctrine of the neutrality rule (or simply the 
neutrality rule) limits the practical defensive measures that can used by directorial or managerial bodies against 
the bidder. The purchase of share follows a similar scenario to that of a merger, in that there is at least a 
possible conflict between directors and shareholders. Then there position is threatened by a loss of control, a 
director may act in his own interest and against the interest of the company. In the American system, this 
potential conflict is resolved by the director's fiduciary duties to company, by which the director is liable to 
company for any infringement of his/her duties. However in the European Union, the European legislator has 
decided to address this potential conflict situation by blocking the director’s prerogatives in regard to the 
frustration of the bid, once the bid is made. 
 The neutrality rule has its origins in the British model. The General Principle no. 7 of the City Code 
prohibits any action of the directors that might affect the bid without shareholder approval. Rule 12 gives us 
examples of types of defensive measures that are in principle prohibited without the GSM’s approval (“issuing 
previously authorized shares, selling assets of material value, or entering in important contractual 
relationships”). 
 Although the two systemic approaches (European and American) on the issue of substantial 
acquisition of shares essentially differ, the intended purpose and the underlying principle appear to be the same. 
Thus applying the rules of neutrality in the American system would increase the power of shareholders, an 
issue generally discouraged in the U.S. However the neutrality rule would have a different impact in the 
continental (civil law) systems, where the main conflict is not between the director and shareholders but 
between majority and minority shareholders (Bebchuk, 2002).  
 So the essential criterion of distinction between the American-based and European-based system on 
the topic of the neutrality rule is the protected subject. As such directors are protected in the U.S. while in the 
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EU protection is provided to the majority shareholders. This distinction is not surprising considering the control 
structures of the two systems. 
 It is interesting that both systems have decided to give the power of decision in regard to a takeover 
and transfer of control to those bodies of the company that generate the most potent conflict of interest when 
faced with an bid (Bebchuk, 2002). The reason for this seems to be that the power to decide on the offer should 
be given the most competent and/or interested company body in the impact of the sale.  
 Following this pattern, if power in takeover bids is given to a particular company party, it is necessary 
then to emphasize what is the most effective means of protection against possible abuse of the deciding body. 
In the Directive’s case, EU pointed out that one of the main goals of the normative act is to provide effective 
protection to shareholders, especially minority shareholders (point 9 of the Preamble of the Directive). 
However, as we will show below, this objective is not fully achieved when applying the Directive in Romania. 
  It is important to mention that, in Romania under the Law no. 31/1990, directors have fiduciary duties 
of loyalty, diligence and confidentiality towards the company, even during the takeover procedures (see ch. 3). 
This analysis is significant given the fact that Romania has introduced the rule of neutrality after it joined the 
EU and adopted its acquis communitaire. Thus the Law no. 297/2004 regarding the capital market through art. 
198 para. 1 states that "the board of directors of the company, subject to the takeover, cannot conclude any act 
and cannot take any measures affecting the takeover or its objectives except those acts of current 
administration, from the time of communication of the preliminary notice [of the takeover bid]" and art. 198 
para. 3 states that "notwithstanding the provisions of par. (1), directors can perform those operations derived 
from obligations incurred prior to publication of the takeover bid, as well as those operations specifically 
approved by the extraordinary general meeting of shareholders convened for this purpose after the preliminary 
announcement [of the takeover bid]."  
 The Directive emphasizes the protection of shareholders as one of its main objectives, especially the 
safeguard of minority shareholder. In Romania this protection, however, does not seem to be achieved through 
the rule of neutrality. In practice, the rule of neutrality removes the ability of the director to decide on a 
possible defensive strategy against the tenderer. 
 The question then is what the duties of the director are in this new paradigm. An indication of this can 
be found in American jurisprudence in regard to fiduciary duties of the director. The Romanian directors’ 
duties have a similar foundation as their American counterparts. Since Romanian jurisprudence is scarce on 
this topic because of increased confidentiality requirements, we have analysed the American case law for a 
pertinent solution (for further information on this topic see ch. 3 of the current study). Thus in Solomon v. 
Armstrong (747 A.2d) Chancellor Chandler emphasized that the duty of loyalty and the general duties of 
directors in connection with a business decision are not removed by the approval of the GSM,  as long as there 
are no majority shareholders. Moreover in Lewis v. Austen (1999 WL 378725) the court agreed that if such a 
GSM decision of validation of actions exists, the directors’ duty of loyalty continues to exist, but the claimant 
must prove a breach of duty to the extent of a lack of information or improper information before the GSM 
decision or by creating a serious economic disadvantage company following the decision (claim of corporate 
waste). The doctrine considers (Muir, 2005) thusly that, in principle, the directors’ duty of loyalty and diligence 
in this type of situation is limited only to adequately informing the shareholder before they make their decision. 
Applying this reasoning in the Romanian system, the rule of neutrality will limit the ability of minority 
shareholders to claim a breach of fiduciary duties by the directors (in Romania, minority shareholders may 
claim a breach of a director’s duty ut singuli if they reach a threshold of 5% of shares) to a breach of a duty to 
properly inform the shareholders. 
 Thus the only protection minority shareholders have against the majority shareholders’ actions in 
cases of hostile takeover is invoking the doctrine of majority abuse. In Romania, the Law no. 31/1990 art. 1361 
establishes that shareholders must exercise their rights in good faith, respecting the rights and interests of the 
company and other shareholders. So to claim abuse of majority we must find bad faith and breach of the 
legitimate interests of company (Catană, 2007). The bad faith of shareholders will manifest through deliberate 
fostering of their own interest at the expense of the minority shareholders. This means of protection is 
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ineffective because the disadvantage to minority shareholders is difficult to prove since in most cases this 
mistreatment is not clear. A hostile takeover (with its shift of control) affects both the majority and minority 
shareholders but can benefit company in the end. So it is difficult, although not impossible, for any legal 
actions claiming abuse of majority to be validated by the courts. Moreover, to the extent that the conditions of 
good faith and respect for the social interest are met, a majority decision cannot be regarded as abusive even if, 
by enforcing it, the company suffers an unfair disadvantage or its prosperity is threatened (Catană, 2007). 
 In addition majority shareholders are not subject to the same fiduciary duty as directors and therefore 
protection of minority shareholders is reduced by the lack of possibility to hold the deciding-party (in takeover 
cases) liable under specific fiduciary duties (e.g. the duty of care which holds the director liable for minimal 
fault). 
 Moreover the fiduciary duties system offers a high degree of protection for minority shareholders if 
directors’ decisions are in the interest of company, since at least in the long term interests of minority 
shareholders are protected. If a breach of a duty of the directors occurs, minority shareholders may bring an 
action for damages against the directors on the basis of art. 1551 of Law 31/1990 (nota bene: the action is 
brought in the interest of whole company although they will be protected indirectly from the abuse of the 
directors). However, if the breach of the duty of directors is due to the actions and/or influence of major 
shareholders and the plaintiffs can prove this, they can claim majority abuse. It is thus debatable to what extent 
the Directive achieves its objective of providing an effective and efficient protection of minority shareholders 
 The neutrality rule can also affect majority shareholders and the company as a whole. From the 
perspective of the general interest of company, the rule of neutrality transfers the risks of the takeover decision 
from the director to the GMS. However companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange usually have a mass 
of dispersed shareholders, whose members will not have the knowledge and experience to make a competent 
decision. One can thus say that the rule of neutrality attacks the very purpose of the director - GSM relationship 
which implies that the director who, especially in publicly-held company, is primarily chosen due to his 
managerial experience, is the most competent to react to a hostile bid in an efficient and timely fashion. This is 
the reason why a director is held liable on such high standards, especially in regard to due diligence. 
 Furthermore, the GSM procedure for publicly traded companies on the BSE is a difficult one which 
involves the performance of different measures of transparency. The Law no. 31/1990 alongside the BSE Code 
and the provisions of Regulation no. 6/2009 (which introduced new rules in regard to the exercise of certain 
rights by shareholders in general meetings of shareholders) outlines a convening procedure which is extensive 
in which the GSM’s decisions will become binding to third parties only after the fulfilment of additional 
disclosure requirements. Thus, at least in the case of Romanian publicly traded companies, GSM meets only 
once or twice a year, and a normal convening procedure with the required validation of decisions takes on 
average three months in Romania. In this context, at least for reasons of celerity, it is unlikely that the AGA 
will be able to decide on a hostile takeover or validate an anti-takeover decision of its directors effectively and 
in a timely fashion. 
 The negative consequences of the situation created by the rule of neutrality are that the GSM will 
directly suffer the risks of the decision. Moreover, if the shareholders have a passive attitude towards this duty, 
in that they will approve any suggestion the director makes, they will run the risk that an erroneous decision of 
the director will affect them directly without the possibility of recourse against the directors for breach of 
fiduciary duties since, as we have noted above, the directors duty in takeover situations seems to be one only 
related to information. 
 The neutrality rule also affects the director’s ability to provide a degree of real protection to the 
company. It is possible for the administrative body to formulate a long-term defensive strategy that could bring 
real benefit to the company. But if every decision on the bid is subject to the GSM, there is a possibility of 
fragmentation of the strategic plan (some decisions will be validated, others not). Furthermore, it is possible 
that the rule will generate disinterest and passivity in the directors’ ranks in regard to their duty to effectively 
protect the company. Since their duty of care can be reduced to one of an informational nature, they will avoid 
drawing strategic measures, limiting themselves to the position of passive intermediaries. In the American 
388   Ioan Șumandea-Simionescu /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  383 – 393 
system based on fiduciary duty, directors, subject to stricter requirements, will be more attentive and involved 
in their actions. 
 Of course you cannot say that the Directive does not offer benefits through its legal reform of the 
takeover system. The European Union seeks to create a uniform standard on takeover bids and purchases of 
shares. This effort is commendable in an area of law so divergent. We can safely say that this approach helps 
countries like Romania, whose capital market have not experienced its full maturation and have not benefited 
from specific legislation which is as competitive as those from other Member States. 
 The main deficiency of the Directive is precisely the approach it proposes in regard to the 
implementation of rules concerning public takeover bids. Company takeovers are a volatile and evolving 
procedure that is strongly influenced by the cultural specificity of the legal origin of a system. The EU decision 
to use a one-size-fits-all approach is not commendable since the Member States regulations in regard to 
takeover bids are so diverse and sometimes incompatible. It is hard to imagine a uniform standard that meets 
the needs of all systems. This is why the Directive has had such a difficult and controversial journey to 
promulgation and that is why it still allows an opt-out option for Member States. 
 Furthermore the specific needs of Member States in this field must be stressed since the takeover 
legislation is extremely difficult for companies to navigate if we consider their autonomy and their ability to 
adapt quickly to changes in the business environment. Therefore it is vital that the decision regarding the level 
and type of protection that is available to shareholders be made by the beneficiaries - the shareholders. 
 Because of this, the European Corporate Governance Institute (Enriques, 2013) proposed in their 
analysis another method of implementing the measures in regard to public takeover bids, aimed in particular 
towards the ability of companies to decide which standard of protection to adopt. Supporters of U.E.’s decision 
to include both an opt-in and opt-out as they are, they suggested that a system of rules (divided into two 
groups) relating to takeover bids can be out into place at least in the regard to companies that are already active 
on the market. In the first group we place a mandatory rules package which would include an opt-out while the 
set of rules would take into account the specificity of the Member States in the field. The second category is a 
set of rules with varying degrees of protection for shareholders. Basically the decision to opt-out or not will be 
of the company and not of the Member State allowing the company to govern and control its internal 
organization. If one chooses to waive the standard rules, the company may choose one of the available standard 
rules packages (opt-in), as it will be necessary to ensure a minimum standard of protection of shareholders. 
Analyses made by the Institute shows that a company will be more prone to change its rules of internal 
organization if there are different sets of rules already created in place which it can choose from in accordance 
with its internal structure. 
 One other issue that the neutrality rule raises relates to the moment when the rule becomes binding 
and applicable. The directors need to know the moment when the neutrality become applicable considering of 
way the directors duties shift under the neutrality rule. The moment of applicability seems to be directly link to 
the level of disclosure that bid should ensure (Gilson, 1992). If it would be enough, for example, for the bidder 
to announce the decision to make a bid without providing any accurate data about the content to offer (such as 
price, the minimum amount of shares they wish to purchase etc.), the bidder is clearly put in a situation of 
advantage since it can block any defensive action of the other party without providing any clear and binding 
representations of the offer. On the other hand, the doctrine has mentioned that if the neutrality rule becomes 
applicable only when every detail of the tender was published and communicated to the company concerned, it 
is possible that directors would have sufficient time to implement defensive measures against the bidder. 
 In Italy, the Commission on Currency Exchange initially interpreted the rule in a similar manner to the 
first scenario but the courts (Tribunal Regional Administrativo and Consiglio di Stato del Lazio) attacked this 
interpretation (Tison, 2009). In Austria, art. 12 of UBG establishes that neutrality rule applies from the 
company in question becomes aware of the existence of the intent of the bidder to place a bid. Given these 
divergent interpretations, the European Commission stated that when applying the neutrality rule, we can only 
consider the moment when the bid becomes public as understood by the laws of the Member State (Tison, 
2009). Of course, in systems where there is an obligation to inform the competent authorities of the bidder's 
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intention to introduce a bid (due to special rules regarding purchase of securities), this interpretation gives 
directors the opportunity to implement defensive measures that are not subject to the rule of neutrality. 
 Another issue of uncertainty raised by the regulations on the neutrality rule is the meaning of the 
“lasting impediment” to the offeror’s acquiring control of the offeree company as presented in art. 9 para. 2 of 
the Directive. A possible interpretation of the text is that the defensive measures taken by the directors that 
temporarily prevent takeover (used, for example, in order to persuade the bidder to withdraw the offer or in 
order to delay the acquiring of control of the offeree until a new possible bidder is found - the White Horse 
defence) are not subject to the rules (Kirchner, 2002) and thus permitted. 
 A final issue that Directive raises is that of the result of a takeover-related interaction between a 
European and non-European companies, particularly U.S. companies. The Directive, as stated in the preamble, 
is a pro-takeover law. In itself this is not a disadvantage nor is it a criticism of the European law. In an area so 
vast and diversified economy as the European Union, there is a real need for purchase of control to be 
achievable goal in a timely manner so as to not affect domestic trade. This is not always possible in the context 
of national legislations that are so divergent. As such the neutrality rule was drafted with a corresponding 
breakthrough rule  (the legal text nullifies all restrictions attached to the shares in case of a valid bid in order to 
facilitate the purchase of share) which function together to facilitate success of such takeover operations in the 
best manner possible. 
 However the U.S. Takeover system is much more flexible and functional. Thus, in a situation where 
an American company makes a public bid for a European company, the American company will be bidding in 
a position of obvious advantage to the oferee company since, on the one hand, the European directors will have 
limited possibilities to defend the company, as presented above, because of the neutrality rule and, secondly 
because of the application of the restrictions of the breakthrough rule, shareholders will not be able to respond 
effectively to a potential bidder's abusive behaviour. 
 Realizing that the harsh European provisions compared to the non-European counterparts, the 
European Union introduced a principle of reciprocity in the Directive. Article 12 para. 3 of the Directive states 
that Member States may, under conditions determined by law, exempt companies which apply the neutrality 
and/or breakthrough rule of their application if they become the subject of an offer launched by a company 
which does not apply the same rules or a company directly or indirectly controlled by such a company. 
 It should be mentioned that, because of the possible disadvantages mentioned above, many Member 
States who have introduced this rule of neutrality, tend to apply it flexibly, allowing directors to enjoy some 
autonomy. Romania introduced a slightly modified variation of the rule of neutrality, establishing a liability for 
the bidder as art. 198 (4) of the Capital Market Law, states that "the seller is liable for all damages caused to 
the company subject to the takeover bid if the offeree company can prove that the bid was released exclusively 
for the purposes of the blocking defensive measures that might have been taken or have been taken by the 
company. " It is questionable, however, whether this legal text provides a real protection of company against 
abuses since (1) it is difficult for the company to prove that the bidder has operated exclusively in order to 
block certain actions of the directors and (2) because of the fast pace at which such transactions are carried out, 
the shareholders might have suffered a great loss or may have lost control of the company by the time they 
could prove the fraudulent intentions of the bidder. Because of this, I believe that the more effective protection 
is a preventive one, as presented by American law, in which the director can respond effectively when an offer 
is presented, followed by an ex-post analysis of the reasonableness of its decision. 
 In seems that this is the type of defence is favoured by many member states. In France, for example, 
the defensive measures taken by directors that may affect a bid are not prohibited by law but are subject to 
specific disclosure requirements (Kirchner, 2002). 
 In German law (Kirchner, 2002), (a legal example followed closely by the Netherlands), at a first 
glance, art. 33 para. 1 of WpUG, would imply that the neutrality rule applies. However art. 33 para. 1 (2) 
stipulates that the Board of Directors (Vorstand) may adopt defensive measures with the approval of the 
Supervisory Board - Aufsichstrat - (the body whose members, although appointed by the GSM, are also 
directors). The existing conflict between directors and shareholders is further amplified if the members of the 
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Aufichstrat are appointed by unions, as is the case in large companies. 
 Moreover, in the German system, the GSM may issue a general preliminary permit 
(Vorratsbeschlusse) by which directors are allowed to modify the act of incorporation. In most continental 
systems, including Romania, this right is only granted to the GSM (Muir, 2005). This preliminary authorization 
can be a defence mechanism against the bidder if the permit is issued before or at the time of the receipt of the 
bid, since it enables directors to modify their status and thus to increase their powers to the extent that they 
could therefore implement any defensive technique previously prohibited. Often these permits work as “blank 
check”- type documents, since they are not conditioned by the existence or content of a bid. 
 Given the flexibility with which the Member States have addressed this rule it is clear that, at national 
level, an approach that allows the director to adjust to the takeover scenario effectively is favoured. Given the 
above, in order to protect the Romanian business environment and the safety of Romanian companies, who 
follow the affectio societatis principle, we believe it necessary de lege ferenda for the neutrality rule to be 
reconsidered. This initiative should be accompanied by a reconsideration of Romanian directors’ duties in 
hostile takeover through the lens of their American counterparts’ position for reasons that we will present in the 
next chapter of the paper. 
 
2. Pathways to reform: rethinking the Romanian directors’ duties in hostile takeovers 
 
The main objective of this paper, as mentioned above, is to analyse the impact the neutrality rule has 
on directors’ duties from the Romanian perspective. The structure and content of these obligations should be 
reconsidered form the vantage point of the American law applicable on the topic. We chose this approach for 
two reasons. First, in the international business environment it is accepted that the United States is the most 
developed legal system when discussing mergers and acquisitions of companies, this being due in no small 
measure to the economically developed capital market and potent momentum of the business transactions. 
Because of this, we believe it favourable to review this system. But it must be stressed that although this part of 
the study is a comparison, the paper will not try to argue the prevalence of a particular system to another. The 
ultimate goal of this analysis is to present the structure of the directors’ duties in this kind of operations, duties 
that might shine a new light on the Romanian takeover duties matrix. 
The second reason that the American system was chosen for this analysis is that American laws on 
directors’ duties can be applied organically in Romanian law. This statement may be considered, at least a 
peculiar one given the strong differences between the common law and civil law systems. 
To explain this, it is necessary to consider the legal origin of the obligations of American managers in 
mergers, spin-offs and acquisitions. The directors’ duties in case of takeovers in the Delaware system as well as 
in other jurisdictions stem from the general fiduciary duties of directors and the business judgment rule 
(Adenas, 2009). 
The same pattern applies to the British system where a breach of fiduciary duty make will make the 
director liable to the company. The legal provisions on breach of fiduciary duties have found their place in 
British regulation through the Companies Act 2006 art. 171 - 173 and art. 175 - 177. Originally a director duty 
was based on the concept of trust and loyalty which trustee a had to manifest towards the represented, the Court 
of Equity decided to protect by legally enforcing the fiduciary duties (Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mathew [1998] Ch 1 per Millett LJ, p.18). 
Following the Company Law (Law no. 31/1990) reform in 2006, Romania introduced the concept of 
fiduciary duty in the Romanian law through art. 1441. Art. 1441 para. 1 speaks of the duty of care of the director 
stating that board members will exercise their mandate with the prudence and diligence of a good director. 
Article 1441 para. 4 impose a duty of loyalty on the director, stating that "the board members shall exercise 
their attributes with loyalty in the interest of company." With regard to the confidentiality, art. 1441, paragraph 
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5-6 of the Romanian Company Law states that board members will not disclose confidential information and 
trade secrets of the company to which they had access in their capacity as directors. This obligation remains 
binding even after quitting his position as director. These fiduciary obligations derive from a mandate or trust 
relation (Catană, 2007) as defined in the New Romanian Civil Code and the Romanian Companies Act. 
The relation between the director and the company was assimilated into the legal doctrine of the 
mandate (as mentioned above) but, by its very structure, it can be likened to legal relation similar to that of an 
administrator of another’s goods (which is a Romanian doctrine similar to a trust legal report in which a party 
manages the goods of another for a sum or free of charge.). It must be noted that similar duties to the ones 
existing in American law appear in the New Romanian Civil Code. Thus when administering the property of 
others, art. 803 of the New Civil Code speaks of the manager’s duty of care, honesty and loyalty to the 
beneficiary, the article stating that the administrator must act with the diligence of a good owner in regard to 
the administration of his property (duty of care) and the administrator must also act with honesty and loyalty in 
order to achieve optimal beneficial interests or intended purpose (duty of loyalty).  
Furthermore, in regard to the Romanian mandate contract, art. 2018 par. 1 part 1 of the New Civil 
Code emphasizes the level of diligence the trustee must fulfil stating that if the mandate is not free of charge, 
the trustee is bound to carry out the mandate with the diligence of a good owner. As we can see, these 
obligations are nearly identical to the fiduciary duties of directors in the American system. 
 In principle, in American law, general fiduciary obligations of directors are applicable to the takeover 
situations (with a few distinctive elements) (Trompenaars, 2011). The evaluation of the directors’ performance 
is based on the business judgment rule. The American doctrine (Allen, 2001) believes that the business 
judgment rule creates a presumption in regard to directors in that (a) the business decision was adopted by a 
director (2) which is independent, (3) the decision was made in good faith and (4) the decision was a 
reasonable one. In addition it was established that the presumption would not be rebutted even if it turned out 
that it was not reasonable as long as it was a rational one. This general rule is then interpreted in American 
takeover law in relation to the circumstances in which the decision was made (Allen, 2001). These changes are 
necessary because of the nature of acquisitions and the substantial risk to which they subject both the 
shareholders and the company. 
 Thus the business judgment rule will be interpreted in a certain way if the director puts into place 
defensive measures against the bidder (Unocal standard) or the GSM approved a sale of control (Revlon 
standard) etc. (Allen, 2001). Romania introduced a similar presumption, also called the business judgment rule, 
through art. 1441 para. 2 of the Romanian Company Law, which states that the director does not violate the 
requirement in para. (1) [duty of care] if in making a business decision he is reasonably entitled to consider that 
he is acting in the best interest of the company and on the basis of adequate information.  
 Romanian doctrine has implied that the American-born business judgment rule, inserted in 2006 in our 
laws, might exonerate a director from liability. The rule recognizes that weaknesses of a company are not 
necessarily the result of negligent or fraudulent activities of the company directors since inherent risk can make 
a decisions taken in good faith a complete failure (Allen, 2001). As long as directors are not influenced by 
personal considerations, are adequately informed in regard to nature of the business decision and are confident 
that decision was taken promptly, based on reasonable information, they will not be held liable, no matter how 
great the damage caused to the company. We can easily see that the Romanian standard is similar to his 
American counterpart, a diminished bonus pater familias standard (Allen, 2001). 
 Considering the above, it becomes vital for the Romanian law to reconsider the directors’ duties in 
hostile takeovers from the perspective of its American counterparts since on the one hand, they are the product 
of extensive case law developed over a long period of time, proving its value in a system where performance 
and quality are the main requirements. On the other hand, inserting American standards into Romanian law is 
possible and even organic due to the similar business decision rule and the nature of the fiduciary duties, so 
introducing such standards in takeover situations are a natural evolution of the Romanian law in this area. 
 There are certainly differences between the two presumptions. First, the American business judgment 
rule is directly applicable when a director approves a business decision. The Romanian business judgment rule 
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becomes applicable only if its three conditions (the business decision, its rationality and the proper 
information) are met. This difference is not essential, it only serves to point out who bears the burden of proof 
(in the U.S. the shareholders, in Romania directors who want to benefit from the presumption). It should be 
noted, however, that the American business judgment rule, when applied to mergers and acquisitions, transfer 
the burden of proof to the director to provide added protection for shareholders in this kind of volatile 
operations. 
 The main difference however is related to the level of fault that the director needs to disprove. In 
American law, the presumption regarding the duty of care will not be overturned unless the plaintiffs can prove 
that the decision was taken by an director in gross negligence (gross negligence is similar to the standard 
present in art. 16 para. 3 of the Romanian Civil Code). In Romanian law, the presumption is rebutted if the 
applicant can prove that the decision was an unreasonable, misinformed or self-interested one. 
 However this difference is not as definitive as one may think when considering recent American case 
law regarding the possibility of a separate obligation of good faith. In two cases in 2003, In re The Walt Disney 
Co.. Derivative Litig. (C.A. No. 15452 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2003)) and In re Abbott Labs. Shareholders 
Derivative Litig.(325 F. 3d 795 2003) it was established that the business judgment rule will not exempt 
directors from liability if they, in making that decision, consciously and intentionally breached fiduciary duties 
by adopting an attitude of disinterest towards the wellbeing of the company (we do not care about the risks 
attitude). So there appears to be a diminution of the protection offered by the U.S. business judgment rule 
aligning it thusly to its Romanian counterpart. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Given the information provided in the present paper, I believe there is already a legal basis that can 
used to pinpoint the specific duties of directors in the event of hostile takeovers in Romania, by using the 
American system as a point of reference. Due to similarities between the American and Romanian directors’ 
fiduciary duties and considering that the Romanian capital market is an area that is heading towards further 
development, the natural progression of the duties of directors of the companies present on the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange should follow the organic evolution of their American counterparts. This development is, however, 
artificially altered by the European neutrality rule. As shown above, the protection of Romanian minority 
shareholders is deficient under the European rule and the interests of Romanian companies and their 
shareholders may be affected by the application of the neutrality rule. Furthermore, the European Directive 
2004/25/EC creates a disadvantage for European companies compared to their non-European equivalents, 
primarily in regard to U.S. companies. 
 For these reasons we believe is necessary de lege ferenda to diminish the application of the neutrality 
rule at least in Romania’s case. This initiative should be accompanied by a reconsideration of Romanian 
directors’ duties in hostile takeover through the lens of their American counterparts’ position, the next stage in 
the evolution of the legal and economic field. 
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